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ABSTRACT
Complex environments provide structured yet variable sensory inputs. To best exploit information
from these environments, organisms must evolve the ability to anticipate consequences of
unknown stimuli, and act on these predictions. We propose an evolutionary path for neural
networks, leading an organism from reactive behavior to simple proactive behavior and from
simple proactive behavior to induction-based behavior. Through in-vitro and in-silico experiments,
we define the conditions necessary in a network with spike-timing dependent plasticity for
the organism to go from reactive to proactive behavior. Our results support the existence of
specific evolutionary steps and four conditions necessary for embodied neural networks to evolve
predictive and inductive abilities from an initial reactive strategy. We extend these conditions to
more general structures.
Keywords: Neural network, Spiking neural network, Predictive coding, LSA, STDP
1 INTRODUCTION
There are surprisingly few hypotheses about how cognitive functions such as generalization and prediction
might have evolved. The ability to generate predictions especially, is often assumed to be a given in
evolutionary simulations. Dennett proposes an evolutionary path by dividing living systems in four
classes (Dennett (1995)): Darwinian creatures, with hard-wired reactions acquired through evolutionary
processes; Skinnerian creatures, with phenotypic plasticity to acquire suitable sensory-motor coupling in
their environment; Popperian creatures, which can predict the outcome of their actions; and Gregorian
creatures, which use knowledge acquired from their predecessors. Dennett also proposes that the biological
creatures must have evolved in this order. The three types of agents discussed in this paper have partial
overlap with Denett’s classification. We focus on a specific definition of “agent”: a neural network
embedded in a body, and able to perform actions that cause changes in the environment. Note that we only
consider agents that are able to learn during their lifetime. Our three types of agents are as follows:
• Reactive agents learn during their lifetime how to react to environmental stimuli. These agents
correspond to Skinnerian creatures.
• Through evolution, if reactive agents become able to act in anticipation of a stimulus before receiving
that stimulus, we call them proactive agents: they can perform actions based on prediction. Proactive
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Behavior
Changing things to your advantage,
obtaining information
Empowerment
Knowing consequences of your 
actions, good or bad
Generalisation
Making your predictions work in 
different contexts
Evolutionary
complexity
Reactive Agent
Proactive Agent
Inductive Agent
Direction of 
evolution
Deals with new inputs based on 
classification of known inputs
Predicts sensory inputs and acts 
based on its expectations
Acts based on current 
conditions in the environment
Figure 1. Our proposal of evolutionary path for reactive agent, proactive agent, and inductive agent.
An organism needs behavior; this need is met by the evolution of actuators to modify the world. It
needs to know the consequences of its actions without necessarily acting them out; this need is met by
evolving predictive abilities. Finally, the agent needs to generalize these predictions, which is the role of
classification. Prediction emerges to improve the agent’s actions, and classification emerges to improve the
agent’s predictions.
agents correspond to Popperian creatures. The idea that organisms constantly try to predict their
environment has been credited for explaining typical perception (Rao and Ballard (1999)), illusions
(Raman and Sarkar (2016); Edwards et al. (2017); Watanabe et al. (2018)), hallucinations (Powers
et al. (2016); Suzuki et al. (2017)), and even consciousness (Seth et al. (2012)). Without going so far,
proactive agents have clear advantages over reactive agents: they can avoid or select behaviors before
experiencing undesirable (resp. desirable) consequences.
• Inductive agents fit in-between Denett’s Popperian and Gregorian creatures. Inductive agents are able to
make generalizations about learned stimuli, and to react to new stimuli based on these generalizations.
As Gregorian creatures must be able to apply knowledge from their predecessors to their own situation,
we can argue that inductive agents must come before Gregorian creatures in terms of evolution.
The distinction between reaction and prediction can be unclear, because learning to react to stimuli is
sometimes inseparable from learning to predict consequences of stimuli. Here, we define a prediction as the
information generated inside an agent, equal to the content of an external input, but preceding that input in
time. The ability to make predictions therefore implies the existence of a generative model inside the agent.
In Chung et al. (2009); Kwon and Choe (2008), Chung and Kwon show through simulated evolution
experiments that neural networks with predictable dynamics are better at generalizing what they learned to
novel tasks. The predictability of network dynamics does not correlate with better performance on known
tasks, but it does correlate with better performance on new tasks, showing that the networks have better
generalization abilities. Unfortunately these results do not tell us about the actual predictive ability of
the networks. Predictable networks do better, but are the networks themselves performing any kind of
predictions on the environment?
The contribution of this paper is to propose a theory of how and why predictive and generalizing abilities
might have evolved in neural networks. To the authors’ knowledge, there is currently no theory relating
these concepts or explaining how, in practice, they would have emerged from an evolutionary point of view.
In this paper, we focus on the evolutionary transition from reactive agents to proactive agents, and from
proactive agents to inductive agents.
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Figure 2. Symmetric spike-timing dependent plasticity between two neurons. Let us consider presynaptic
neuron i, postsynaptic neuron j, and the connection wi,j from i to j. If neuron i fires just before neuron
j (i.e., ∆tp < 20 ms), the synaptic weight increases by ∆w. If neuron i fires just after neuron j (i.e.,
∆td < 20 ms), the synaptic weight decreases by ∆w.
Fig. 1 shows how these three functions are linked, and the environmental needs these functions can
fulfill for an embodied agent. An agent first needs behavior: the ability to change its environment to its
advantage. This need is met by reactive agents: through action, they can change their environment. An
agent that can only react to the environment does not have much control on its future. Increasing this control
is increasing empowerment. Empowerment is a quantity defined as how much the agent can potentially
influence the environment. It quantifies not what the agent actually does, but what it can “potentially” do to
influence the environment Klyubin et al. (2005). To increase its empowerment, an agent needs to predict the
consequences of its actions: these are proactive agents. Finally comes a need for generalization: the ability
to recognize new inputs as being similar to known inputs, and to generate appropriate predictions. This
need is met by inductive agents through classification. We argue that action, prediction and classification
emerge from the bottom up: prediction emerges from action and classification emerges from prediction.
As a practical example of learning rule that can be used for the three functions, we use results from
our experiments with Learning by Stimulation Avoidance (LSA). LSA (Sinapayen et al. (2017)) is a
property exhibited by spiking networks coupled with Spike-Timing Dependent Plasticity rules (STDP;
Caporale and Dan (2008)): the networks learn the behaviors that stop external stimulation, and they learn
to avoid the behaviors that start external stimulation. Neither LSA nor STDP are considered as necessary
mechanisms in this paper; we take them as one practical example of how our ideas can be implemented,
and we acknowledge that other implementations are possible.
STDP causes changes in synaptic weights between two firing neurons depending on the timing of their
activity (Fig. 2). For a presynaptic neuron i, postsynaptic neuron j, and the connection wi,j from i to j: if
neuron i fires just before neuron j, wi,j increases (long-term potentiation [LTP]), and if neuron i fires just
after neuron j, wi,j decreases (long-term depression [LTD]).
In LSA, two mechanisms for avoiding stimulation emerge based on STDP. We explain these two
mechanisms through a minimal case with three neurons: an input neuron, an output neuron, a hidden
neuron. The input neuron is connected to the two other neurons (Fig. 3). The hidden neuron has no effect
on other neurons or on the environment, and fires randomly. The first mechanism, mediated by LTP,
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Figure 3. Learning by Stimulation Avoidance in three neurons: input neuron, output neuron, and hidden
neuron. A: Reinforcement dynamics of LSA. For an embodiment where if the output neuron fires right after
stimulation from its environment, the stimulation is temporarily removed, the time window ∆tp1 between
spikes of the input neuron and spikes of the output neuron gradually becomes smaller on average than the
time window ∆td1 between spikes of the output neuron and spikes of the input neuron. LTP being stronger
than LTD, the connection weight from the input neuron to the output neuron increases. On the other hand,
the connection from the input neuron to the hidden neuron barely changes, as the time windows ∆tp2 and
∆td2 are similar on average. B: Weakening dynamics of LSA. For an embodiment where if the output
neuron fires, stimulation to the input neuron starts, the time window ∆tp1 between spikes of the input
neuron and spikes of the output neuron gradually becomes larger on average than the time window ∆td1
between spikes of the output neuron and spikes of the input neuron. The effect of LTD become stronger
than the effect of LTP, and the connection weight from the input neuron to the output neuron decreases. On
the other hand, the connection from the input neuron to the hidden neuron barely changes.
reinforces behaviors that lead to a decrease in stimulation (Fig. 3-A). We assume an embodiment in which
if the output neuron fires, the stimulation to the input neuron is temporarily and immediately removed
(the action of firing leads to a decrease of external stimulation). This leads the connection weight from
the input neuron to the output neuron to increase, because on average the effect of LTP is stronger than
the effect of LTD. On the other hand, the connection from the input neuron to the hidden neuron barely
changes, because on average the effect of LTP and LTD are similar. Thus behaviors leading to a decrease
in stimulation are reinforced. The second mechanism, mediated by LTD, is the weakening of behaviors
leading to an increase in stimulation (Fig. 3-B). We assume an embodiment in which if the output neuron
fires, then stimulation from the environment to the input neuron starts (the action of firing leads an increases
of external stimulation). In that case, the connection weight from the input neuron to the output neuron
decreases because on average the effect of LTD is stronger than the effect of LTP. The connection from the
input neuron to the hidden neuron barely changes because the effects of LTP and LTD are equivalent on
average. Thus behaviors leading to increases in stimulation are weakened.
We explained LSA in a minimal case for the sake of clarity, but these dynamics work in larger networks
that can express a greater variety output patterns, as we demonstrated in Sinapayen et al. (2017); Masumori
4
Sinapayen et al. Reactive, Proactive, and Inductive Agents
Figure 4. A robot is moving on a line. At the end of the line, bumping into a wall causes stimulation.
Turning around stops the stimulation by allowing the robot to move away from the wall.
et al. (2017); Masumori (2019). Among all output patterns, output patterns leading to a decrease in
stimulation are reinforced by the first mechanism; output patterns leading to an increase in stimulation
are weakened by the second mechanism. There is one limitation to the scalability of these networks: the
bigger the network, the more internal noise the output neurons receive, and the harder it is for the network
to learn a task. We previously showed that there is a lower limit of signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) in the
network for LSA. The SNR decreases when the network size increases, and at the size of 60,000 neurons
the network cannot learn even simple behaviors (Masumori (2019)). Below, we discuss the conditions for
the emergence of various behaviors in networks subject to LSA.
We first demonstrate the existence of three conditions required to obtain reactive behavior in biological
networks as well as simulated networks (Section 2). We then show that a few modifications in the topology
allow simulated networks to learn to predict external stimuli (Section 3.1). Finally, we explain how the
reactive and predictive structures can be coupled to produce proactive behavior (Section 3.2) before
discussing how inductive behavior can emerge from predictions (Section 4).
2 REACTIVE BEHAVIOR IN BIOLOGICAL AND SIMULATED NETWORKS
Let us remind the definition of reactive agents from the introduction of this paper:
Definition: Reactive agents learn during their lifetime how to react to environmental stimuli.
Even without neural plasticity, an agent can act reactively using hard-wired abilities as Darwinian
creatures do. However, hard-wired reactive behavior can have negative consequences if environmental
changes happen during an individual life time. For example, a behavior resulting in a food reward might
result in getting poisoned in the future. In an environment that changes rapidly, learning reactive behavior
is an effective way to help the survival of the agent. In this section, we focus on some necessary conditions
to learn reactive behavior.
In a previous study (Sinapayen et al. (2017)), we showed that spiking networks with STDP exhibit LSA.
The behaviors learned by these networks is reactive: they learn to perform an action after receiving a certain
type of stimulation. We offer a simple example in Fig. 4. A robot is moving on a line. At the end of the line,
bumping into a wall causes stimulation through distance sensors. Turning around stops the stimulation by
allowing the robot to move away from the wall. The robot gradually learns to turn away when its distance
sensors are stimulated by the walls.
In this section, we focus on the necessary conditions for reactive behavior to be learned (Fig. 5). We
identify one qualitative condition for the network, Connectivity: relevant information from the sensors
must be able to reach the actuators of the agent. In the specific case of LSA, it means that input neurons
must be able to directly or indirectly transmit stimulation from the environment to the output neurons. This
condition can be broken if intrinsic noise is destroying the signal or if the path from sensors to actuators is
5
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Figure 5. Necessary conditions for reactive behavior: Connectivity condition for the network: relevant
information from the environment must be able to reach the actuators of the agent. In the specific case
of LSA, it means that input neurons must be able to directly or indirectly transmit stimulation from the
environment to the output neurons. Controllability condition for the environment: there must be an output
pattern from the network that can inhibit the stimulation through some action. Finally, there is a time
condition: the input-output loop must be closed in less time than a specific time window τ . The value of τ
depends on the memory of the network. It is the time window during which the network can evaluate the
consequences of a specific action.
destroyed. This condition is simple, but we build on it in following sections. There is another qualitative
condition for the environment, Controllability: there exists a subset of outputs from the agent that can
modify the source of the input in the environment. This definition is a special case of the definition of
control by Klyubin et al (Klyubin et al. (2005)). In the specific case of LSA, it means that there is an output
pattern from the network that can inhibit the stimulation through an action (e.g. turning away from the
wall); it can also mean that there is an action from the network that can start the stimulation to the input
neurons, in which case this action will be avoided by the network in the future. The last condition is a
quantitative time constraint linking the network and the environment: (1) the input-output loop must be
closed in less time than τ . τ is the time window during which the network can evaluate the consequences
of a specific action that it took. This time constant depends on the memory of the network. For example, in
a simulated minimal spiking network with two neurons and in the absence of long term memory, τ is equal
to 20 ms (the time constant of the STDP learning rule). The weights of a neuron’s connections are only
changed by STDP during this 20 ms time window before or after the neuron spikes, so an action by the
network in response to a stimulation must take effect in the environment in less than 20 ms, for the action
to be associated to the input and learned by the network.
A reactive agent must respect these conditions. In the following subsections, we explore the consequences
of these conditions and show that they are necessary for the network to learn reactive behavior based on
results from our previous studies.
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2.1 Controllability
In a previous paper, we showed that simulated networks and biological networks can learn the wall
avoidance task in a one-dimensional environment (Fig 4; Masumori et al. (2018)) through LSA. This is
reactive behavior, as the robot must react to the wall by turning around. In those studies we compared
the results when Controllability is respected (the target output from the network stops the stimulation
immediately, ∆t2 = 0 ms) and when Controllability is not respected (the stimulation is random and no
output can stop it). The Connectivity condition was respected in both conditions. In the controllable setting,
the networks learned to react to the stimulation by firing the expected output; in the uncontrollable setting,
the networks did not learn to react to the input. Controllability is therefore necessary for proper learning in
both biological and simulated networks.
2.2 Connectivity
In a previous study, we also evaluated the relation between connectivity and learning success in biological
networks (Masumori (2019)). To evaluate the connectivity between the input neurons and the output
neurons, we defined the connectivity measure as the ratio of connections with low time delay between
input neurons and output neurons. We defined a success measure as the decrease of reaction time (time
between reaching the wall and turning away from it). We found a strong correlation between connectivity
and success; in addition, if the connectivity measure is zero (no appropriate connections between input and
output), the network cannot learn the behavior to avoid the stimulation. Connectivity is therefore necessary
for proper learning in biological networks, and although we have not yet conducted simulation experiments,
we argue that this condition should be respected in simulated networks.
Since, for LSA, the loop formed by stimuli - input neurons - output neurons - feedback from output
to stimuli should be closed within a specific time window, it is clear that a time condition is required.
In the previous study, we showed that the this loop must be closed in 40 ms in simulated networks with
100 neurons (Masumori (2019)). The embodiment was idealized: the time delay for executing an action
was dismissed. However, in nature there are large differences between the timescale of synaptic plasticity
and timescale of behavior: e.g., in Drosophila, synaptic plasticity lasts a few milliseconds, behaviors
last seconds(Drew and Abbott (2006)). This difference becomes larger if for bigger and more complex
bodies. One way of bridging this gap is to sustain the response to stimuli (Drew and Abbott (2006)). This
mechanism might be required if the embodiment is more complex.
3 PROACTIVE BEHAVIOR IN SIMULATED NETWORKS
Definition: Proactive agents perform actions based on prediction.
Although it is difficult to discuss the evolution of prediction separately from action, we first focus on the
necessary conditions for a network to learn to predict environmental input without any actions. We then
add actions back into the picture and discuss proactive agents.
3.1 Predictions
In the introduction we defined a prediction as information generated inside an agent, equal to the content
of external input, but preceding that input in time. To make predictions, an agent therefore needs an internal
generative model and a way to compare the output of that model to the input from the environment.
In Fig. 6, we hypothesize that the comparison operation is done by inhibitory neurons (Buonomano
(2000); Rao and Sejnowski (2001); Wacongne et al. (2012)). These neurons can compute prediction errors
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Inhibitory neurons
Input 
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Transmission
Δt1
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Time conditions:
(1) 0 < Δt1 + Δt2 ≤ 𝛕 
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Figure 6. Necessary conditions for prediction: Predictability condition for the environment: the time
correlation between the stimulus at T1 (unpredictable anticipatory stimulus) and the stimulus at T2
(predictable target stimulus) must be reliable, i.e. the environment must provide predictable stimuli
in order for predictions to be learned. Connectivity condition for the network: input neurons must be able
to directly or indirectly transmit and receive stimulation from the inhibitory neurons. Time conditions:
(1) the transmission and the inhibition must be closed in less time than τ ; (2) time condition: the interval
between the anticipatory stimulus and the target stimulus must be closed in less time than τ . The value of τ
depends on the memory of the network.
by inhibiting external stimulation: the error is null if the output of the inhibitory neurons and the external
stimulation are exactly opposite. Since the STDP rule does not change, in the case of LSA the only
evolutionary step between reactive and proactive agents is the addition of inhibitory neurons in the network.
On the network, we still have the Connectivity condition: relevant information from the sensors must be
able to reach the comparison units of the network. In the particular case of LSA, the prediction signal and
the input to be predicted come to the inhibitory neurons; Connectivity is respected if the input neurons
are able to directly or indirectly transmit and receive stimulation from the inhibitory neurons. This is the
condition that allows us to consider predictions as information generated by the network, equal to the
information of the target input, but preceding it: the inhibitory neurons must fire just before the input
neurons in order to suppress the incoming stimulation. On the environment, we have one new condition,
Predictability: the time correlation between the stimulus at T1 (unpredictable anticipatory stimulus)
and the stimulus at T2 (predictable target stimulus) must be reliable, i.e. the environment must provide
predictable stimuli in order for predictions to be learned. In the case of LSA, the condition is strict: T1 can
be random, but T1 − T2 ≈ constant, or the prediction cannot be learned. Not all environments respect this
condition: for example, at micro-scales, the motion of small particles is stochastic.
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There are also two time conditions; (1) is unchanged, the input-output loop must be closed in less time
than τ . The new condition is (2) The time delay between the two stimuli must be smaller than the total
processing time of the network. This condition simply states that the network cannot generate predictions
on a bigger timescale than the timescale of its own memory.
Our previous results with a simulated minimal network consisting of three neurons (1 anticipatory input
neuron stimulated at T1, 1 target input neuron stimulated at T2 and 1 inhibitory neuron in between), which
satisfies these conditions, could predict a simple causal sequence of stimuli (Masumori (2019)). Our
preliminary results show that if the time interval between T1 and T2 becomes large, the network is not able
to learn to predict the sequence.
This suggests that our proposed topology makes the network strengthen the path from anticipatory to
target neurons, and that the Predictability condition and the time condition (2) are necessary to learn
predictions.
Therefore predictive abilities can evolve from a reactive agent by adding only one element to its neural
network: inhibitory connections. In the next subsection, we discuss the necessary conditions to obtain a
agent that not only predicts inputs, but also acts on these predictions.
3.2 Proactive behavior
The reactive agent discussed in Section 2 can only initiate an action in relation to a stimulus after starting
to receive that stimulus. In the worst case, even if the agent learns a reaction to a damaging stimulus, it
cannot avoid the damage itself. If only the agent could predict the damage when getting the anticipatory
stimulus, it could initiate an avoiding behavior before getting damaged. In this purely speculative section,
we discuss how prediction and action can be combined into proactive behavior.
In Fig. 6, there is only minimal processing happening between the reception of an input and the next
prediction. Fig. 7 shows how to leverage more complex processing. For clarity, the output and input neurons
are separated, but in the simplest case a neuron can act both as an input (by receiving external stimulation)
and as an output (by outputting directly to an inhibitory neuron). Here the task of the output neurons is to
activate the right inhibitory neurons at the right time: the output neurons play the role of generative model.
After valid predictions start being learned by the network, these predictions and the model that generates
them can be harnessed not simply by the inhibitory neurons, but can be used to guide the behavior of the
agent. Now the agent respects our definition of proactive behavior: cued by an anticipatory stimulus, it
generates a prediction, and acts based on that prediction. For example, learning to move to avoid damage
following an anticipatory stimulus.
From an evolutionary point of view, predictions can only evolve if they provide increased fitness to the
agent. The proactive agent must therefore either evolve directly from a reactive agent, or predictions must
have evolved as a side effect of some other fitness-increasing process. How is this possible? A plausible
evolutionary path might have looked like this: first, reactive agents with increased number of neurons
are favored by evolution thanks to their bigger repertoire of reactive behaviors. Since coupling several
excitatory neurons together leads to over-excitation of the network (maladaptive, synchronized bursts in
vitro (Wagenaar et al. (2005))), mutations leading to the apparition of inhibitory neurons are favored. Even
randomly coupled, inhibitory neurons tend to stabilize spiking networks (Brunel (2000)). In this random
structure, some of the inhibitory neurons will learn predictions because of LSA, even if the predictions
are not used by the agent. Eventually, the agents that randomly learn to make use of these predictions
9
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Figure 7. Necessary conditions for proactive behavior: Predictability condition for the environment: the
time correlation between the stimulus at T1 (unpredictable anticipatory stimulus) and the stimulus at T2
(predictable target stimulus) must be reliable, i.e. the environment must provide predictable stimuli in
order for predictions to be learned. Connectivity condition for the network: input neurons must be able to
transmit stimulation to inhibitory neurons via output neurons and receive stimulation from the inhibitory
neurons. Time conditions: (1) the interval between the anticipatory stimulus and the target stimulus must
be closed in less time than τ ; (2) the time window between transmission and inhibition must be smaller
than τ . The value of τ depends on the memory of the network.
are rewarded by higher fitness, and the structure of the network becomes less random and closer to our
proposed structure, to favor the production of predictions. We could then have proactive agents.
Previous studies have shown that spiking neural networks with reward-modulated synaptic plasticity
can learn proactive behaviors, as in reinforcement learning (Vasilaki et al. (2009)). These models require
neuromodulators such as dopamine. We argue that these neuromodulators are not required for proactive
behavior, i.e. proactive agents could well evolve without dopaminergic neurons.
4 SPECULATING ABOUT INDUCTIVE AGENTS
Definition: Inductive agents make generalizations about past stimuli, and react to new stimuli based on
these generalizations.
The proactive agent can learn temporal sequences of stimuli, but it cannot extract relevant features
to generalize its predictions. It is unable to judge the similarity between two stimuli, and must learn
predictions anew for every single stimulus.
The last step of the path is the inductive agent. Its ability to perform classification is an advantage when
the environment is variable or noisy. In these conditions, the agent must learn to abstract relevant signals
from variable inputs.
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Here the “similarity” of inputs can be defined in relation to the predictions that they elicit. For example,
if a set of inputs A’ are all just noisy versions of input A, they should lead to the same predictions and can
therefore be considered similar; A’ and A belong to the same class. “Noise” is one type of variation, but
there can be others that still lead to “similar” predictions, where this time prediction similarity is defined
relatively to the actions afforded by the predictions. The notion of similarity can in this way be propagated
from the bottom up through all 3 functions: action, prediction, and classification. Same action or same
prediction caused by some inputs means that the inputs belong to the same class.
With artificial networks, classification is typically considered in the context of labelled data. The labels
are used to compute an error signal that is propagated from the output neurons to the input neurons. For an
agent in the biological world, there are usually no labels, and reward/error signals from the environment
are too sparse to learn to classify even a few thousands of inputs.
Predictions can provide the abundant error signal necessary to learn classification: each time step provides
a prediction error. The connections in the network can be optimized at each time step to give better
predictions. Let us suppose a cost on updating the connections in the network: changing the weight of one
connection is less costly than changing the weight of two connections, etc. We now have the perfect setup
for the emergence of hierarchies of classes.
In hierarchical networks, the input from lower layers is aggregated in upper layers into classes that are
more and more general. The most invariant properties of the input end up being represented by the classes
at the top of the hierarchy. In our proposal, the neurons receiving the raw prediction error are the neurons
close to the input neurons, lower in the hierarchy (note that this is the opposite of Deep Learning Neural
Network architectures, where the error signal is propagated from higher layers to lower input layers). The
lower layers can remove as much variance as possible from the input before passing it to upper neurons.
Most of the prediction error, due to the most variable properties of the input, will be corrected in these
lower layers. The remaining error is progressively corrected by updating weights in upper layers. Our
proposal therefore minimizes the cost of learning by having the entry point of the error signal close to the
input neurons.
Fo¨ldia´k (1991) demonstrate a similar result in simulation: with a local learning rule (minimizing the
number of weights being updated), a predictive neural network learns invariances in temporal sequences
and becomes able to do simple generalizations through groups of cells reacting to similar inputs.
Thus we hypothesize that predictive abilities are a necessary condition to obtain the abundant error signal
required to learn classification, and updating costs are a necessary condition to obtain the hierarchical,
modular structure characteristic of generalization. A consequence of this hypothesis is that classification
emerges as a way to improve the quality of predictions.
5 DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have outlined necessary, practical evolutionary steps to go from a reactive to an inductive
agent. The steps require 4 conditions to be satisfied:
• Connectivity: relevant information from the sensors must be able to reach the comparison units of the
network
• Predictability: the time correlation between unpredictable anticipatory stimuli and predictable target
stimuli must be reliable
• Time condition (1): the input-output loop must be closed in less time than a specific time window τ
11
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• Time condition (2): the transmission and the inhibition must be closed in less time than τ
The reactive agent, although requiring preliminary conditions (Controllability, Connectivity, and
time condition (1)), does not require a well-designed network structure. The network requires only
excitatory neurons for the agent to learn reactive behaviors. Prediction requires two additional conditions:
Predictability and time condition (2). A network respecting simple structural rules and containing inhibitory
neurons can learn predictive behaviors. The proactive agent, in addition to the four previous conditions,
requires a more well-designed structure. Our results support the hypothesis that in evolutionary history,
at first, reactive agents emerge with simple structured network with limited type of neurons (excitatory
neurons) and neuronal plasticity. Proactive agents evolve from reactive agents with more structured network
with various type of neurons (excitatory neurons and inhibitory neurons). Inductive agents, in addition to
the previous conditions, require to have a cost on updating the weights of the network connections.
Our proposed action-prediction-classification evolutionary path therefore requires, in this order, the
evolution of: excitatory neurons, inhibitory neurons, cost-based network structure.
What experiments could consolidate or disprove our hypotheses? To demonstrate our proposed step for
the transition from action to prediction, we must show that inhibitory neurons are used for prediction. This
could be demonstrated by finding a positive correlation between the activity of inhibitory neurons and the
value of target stimuli in the environment, especially in animals with a simple nervous system.
The transition from prediction to classification might be supported by extending the experiments of
Kwong et al. (Kwon and Choe (2008)). They showed that generalization might have evolved from networks
with predictable internal dynamics. If ”predictable internal dynamics” reflect the fact that the networks have
learned to predict the environment, and this environmental predictablity is mirrored by internal predictability,
then this would support our hypothesis of a transition from predictive networks to generalizing networks. In
addition, if the predictable networks show a hierarchical internal structure with error correction happening
primarily at lower layers, this would further support our proposed mechanism for the transition from
prediction to classification. This would demonstrate the relationship between classification and prediction.
Our four types of agents depart from Dennett’s four classes in two major ways. First, we are only
interested in learning happening during the lifetime of an agent: Dennett’s Darwinian creatures (which have
no learning ability) and Gregorian creatures (which pass knowledge on beyond the timescale of a lifetime)
are out of the scope of our considerations. Secondly, we introduce the inductive agent as a step between
Popperian and Gregorian creatures, thus arguing that the ability to generalize through the classification
of stimuli is evolutionary distinct from predictive abilities and different from trans-generational learning.
Focusing on the evolutionary links between agents’ abilities made this new classification necessary.
There is recent interest in common AI approaches towards predictive networks, yet the connection
between action, prediction, and classification is rarely explored. Indeed, until recently, disembodied
classifying networks represented most of the state of the art. From there, interest is slowly shifting towards
predictive networks. Our results suggest that the opposite direction, focusing on prediction and from there
evolving classification abilities, can be a fruitful area of research.
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